Jete – Journal of Philosophy, Religious and Cultural Studies
ISSN: 3080-1281. eISSN: 3080-6895.

МӘДЕНИЕТТАНУ – CULTURAL STUDIES – КУЛЬТУРОЛОГИЯ

МРНТИ 04.71.31
Научная статья

https://doi.org/10.32523/3080-1281-2026-155-2-178-194

LANDSCAPE AS A HIDDEN REPRESENTATION: THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE AND ITS ALLEGORIES

Nataliya VOLKOVA

Independent researcher, Moscow, Russian Federation,

chestrek@gmail.com

Abstract. The paper explores the relationships among comedy and landscape, as suggested by Henri Bergson. Bergson argues that the landscape cannot be social, but can be used as a metaphor to distinguish between mechanistic and social features in the comedy of social life. In contrast to Bergson, the paper implies that the landscape is valuable not only as a metaphor, but also has a social dimension that is not necessarily representational. While Bergson focuses on social risks and drama as representations of social types, this paper turns to the concepts of natural risk and vision. The first part of the paper leads to the idea of risk as cultural, according to Jeffrey Alexander and Scott Lash. Two approaches differ in their understanding of the source of cultural risk, but both balance natural and social risks by introducing the division of past/present events or visible/invisible objects. In the second section, to introduce a strategy to overcome the divisions and representational character of Alexander's and Lash's theories, their conceptualisations will be developed with reference to Eisenstein's three types of pathetic composition, as well as distinguishing the landscape's figures and background. In conclusion, the landscape is defined as an allegorical method of testing social metaphors.

Keywords: landscape; metaphor; background; organization; comedy; vision; risk.

For citation: Volkova, N. (2026). Landscape as a hidden representation: The sociology of culture and its allegories. Jete – Journal of Philosophy, Religious and Cultural Studies, 155(2),179-195, https://doi.org/10.32523/3080-1281-2026-155-2-178-194

ПЕЙЗАЖ ЖАСЫРЫН КӨРІНІС РЕТІНДЕ: МӘДЕНИЕТ ӘЛЕУМЕТТАНУЫ ЖӘНЕ ОНЫҢ АЛЛЕГОРИЯЛАРЫ

[a]Наталия ВОЛКОВА

[a]Тәуелсіз зерттеуші, Мәскеу, Ресей Федерациясы

ПЕЙЗАЖ КАК СКРЫТАЯ РЕПРЕЗЕНТАЦИЯ: СОЦИОЛОГИЯ КУЛЬТУРЫ И ЕЕ АЛЛЕГОРИИ

[a]Наталия ВОЛКОВА

Независимый исследователь, Москва, Российская Федерация

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Анри Бергсон ұсынған комедия мен пейзаж арасындағы қатынас зерттелген. Бергсон пейзаж әлеуметтік бола алмайды, бірақ әлеуметтік өмір комедиясындағы механикалық және әлеуметтік белгілерді ажырату үшін метафора ретінде қолданылуы мүмкін деп тұжырымдайды. Бергсоннан айырмашылығы, мақалада пейзаж тек метафора ретінде ғана емес, сонымен қатар бейнелеумен міндетті түрде байланысты емес әлеуметтік өлшемге ие екендігі дәлелденеді. Бергсон әлеуметтік байланыстарды бейнелеу ретінде әлеуметтік тәуекелдер мен драмаға назар аударса, бұл мақалада біз табиғи тәуекелдер мен көзқарас тұжырымдамаларына жүгінеміз. Мақаланың бірінші бөлімінде тәуекелді мәдениеттің элементі деп санайтын Джеффри Александер мен Скотт Лэштің идеялары қарастырылады. Александер мен Лэштің тәсілдері мәдени тәуекелдің қайнар көзі туралы түсініктерімен ерекшеленеді, бірақ екеуі де өткен / қазіргі оқиғалардың немесе көрінетін / көрінбейтін объектілердің бөлінуін енгізу арқылы табиғи және әлеуметтік тәуекелдерді теңестіреді. Екінші бөлімде Александер мен Лэш теорияларындағы бөліну мен репрезентативтік сипатты жеңу стратегиясын ұсыну үшін олардың тұжырымдамалары Эйзенштейннің патетикалық композициясының үш түріне қолданылады, олардың негізінде пейзаждың фигуралары мен фонының қарама-қайшылығы жатыр. Қорытындылай келе, пейзаж әлеуметтік метафораларды тексерудің аллегориялық әдісі ретінде анықталады.

Түйін сөздер: пейзаж; метафора; фон; ұйымшылдық; комедия; көзқарас; тәуекел.

Аннотация. В статье исследуются отношения между комедией и пейзажем, предложенные Анри Бергсоном. Бергсон утверждает, что пейзаж не может быть социальным, но может использоваться как метафора, чтобы различать механистические и социальные черты в комедии социальной жизни. В отличие от Бергсона, в статье доказывается, что пейзаж ценен не только как метафора, но и имеет социальное измерение, которое не обязательно связано с репрезентацией. В то время как Бергсон фокусируется на социальных рисках и драме как на представлении социальных связей, в этой статье мы обращаемся к концепциям естественных рисков и видения. В первой части статьи следуем за идеями Джеффри Александера и Скотта Лэша, которые считают риск элементом культуры. Подходы Александера и Лэша различаются по своему пониманию источника культурного риска, но оба уравновешивают природные и социальные риски, вводя разделение прошлых/настоящих событий или видимых/невидимых объектов. Во втором разделе, чтобы представить стратегию преодоления разделения и репрезентативного характера в теориях Александера и Лэша, их концептуализации будут применены к трем типам патетической композиции Эйзенштейна, в основе которых лежит противопоставление фигур и фона пейзажа. В заключение пейзаж определяется как аллегорический метод проверки социальных метафор.

Ключевые слова: пейзаж; метафора; фон; организация; комедия; видение; риск.

Дәйексөз үшін:

Волкова, Н., В. (2026). Пейзаж жасырын көрініс ретінде: мәдениет әлеуметтануы және оның аллегориялары. Jete – Journal of Philosophy, Religious and Cultural Studies, 155(2), 179-195, https://doi.org/10.32523/3080-1281-2026-155-2-178-194

Для цитирования:

Волкова, Н., В. (2026). Пейзаж как скрытая репрезентация: социология культуры и ее аллегории. Jete – Journal of Philosophy, Religious and Cultural Studies, 155(2), 179-195, https://doi.org/10.32523/3080-1281-2026-155-2-178-194

Introduction

In his early essay 'Laughter', Henri Bergson develops the notion of the landscape in two ways. First, he sees the landscape as a natural, real thing, which 'may be beautiful, charming and sublime, or insignificant and ugly; it will never be laughable' (Bergson 2003: 9). The last part of this definition is crucial. Bergson insists that the ability to laugh and be laughed at is the defining feature of human intelligence and humans as social beings. The landscape is different because it is not social; it is a lifeless object that is full of feelings, attitudes, and expressions, but they are only mechanistic forces that drive its existence (Bergson 2014: 79). Regarding the second approach, Bergson changes the perspective from a realistic to a metaphorical view of the landscape. For Bergson, the *real* landscape is too serious, thus laughter turns it into a metaphor of the landscape or *comedy*. The comic landscape reveals the typical features of social life, although it is non-representational and only gives the scheme of reality. According to Bergson, comedy assumes the landscape's main features: The comic effect is the result of the mechanistic movements that allow us to see comic characters as things (Bergson 2003). Yet since the comedy is not material, Bergson opposes the natural landscape contra the social landscape of comedy, or, if we put it more clearly, not only can comedy be a metaphor for the *landscape*, but the social landscape is also a metaphor for *comedy*.

The difference between the natural and metaphorical landscapes lies in their attitude toward risk. Laughter produces the fear of being comic and perceived not as a living being, but as a material thing. The fear and risk of a comic situation are social because 'comic effects…refer to the customs and ideas of a particular social group' (Ibid.: 11) and laughter refuses to recognise a comic object's individuality. When the landscape is natural or social, the risks should not be reduced only to the social landscape. There are two ways to return the landscape's social dimension according to two main features that are common in Bergson's natural landscape and comedy: the mechanical structure of movement and the resemblance between live and material objects. In both ways, the landscape's features, defined by Bergson as material, are also social and establish a link between social and natural risks, which drive changes in landscape. If the landscape's structure is considered social, its material and territorial features are denied. Thus, discussion of the landscape can follow different approaches of structuralism and post-structuralism, in which the landscape is an 'abstract machine', a texture of rhythms or a 'space of social events'. Nevertheless, these approaches share the intention to introduce the universal structure that underlies the landscape's material form, addressing the different levels of abstraction and defining the landscape's social morphology. In contrast, Bergson asserts that only the landscape is universal because it is ruled by the mechanistic laws of nature (Bergson 2014), while the social landscape is live and changeable (Bergson 2003). This paper draws a connection between the landscape's social and natural dimensions, which should overcome the universality suggested by structuralism.

The second way to return the sociality of a real landscape is to see the landscape as an organisation of risky socio-material or *cultural* objects. In the first part of the paper, the difference between the drama and vision of landscape is elaborated upon, with reference to the definitions of cultural objects and risk, according to the theories of culture by Jeffrey Alexander (Alexander 2006) and Scott Lash (Lash 2000). If the landscape is dramatic, it is representational, but the vision can be non-representational. In the second half of the paper, the notion of the comic vision of the landscape is in the focus of the discussion, opposing the sociological metaphors of the landscape, and shifting toward the visual metaphors of pathetic composition developed by Sergei Eisenstein (Eisenstein 1987). Being risky, the socio-material objects are multiple and incoherent. Hence, in the second section of the paper, the landscape is defined as an organisation of the contradictory gathering of objects according to John Law (Law 2004). If the landscape is non-representational and encompasses objects that produce natural risks, then the idea of the landscape moves from the concept of drama (comedy) to the landscape of the imagination.

Drama and Vision

The show must go on: The radicalisation of social and natural risks

For Bergson, the landscape is social and human only; it is a metaphor that defines the logic of comic drama, while the natural landscape of Beck, or the *environment*, is the permanent drama 'after the narrative is over' (Beck 1992: 12), which represents the 'off-stage reality' (Ibid.) of the post-industrial age. Despite the differences between the on-stage and off-stage dramas, Bergson's comedy and Beck's drama share the same main point: Both dramas

radicalise social life to detach typical features from individuals. However, the outcomes of such radicalisation differ vastly. The radicalisation of human and live features in comedy removes individuality and rests only upon the image of a typical social role (Bergson 2003). Unlike Bergson, Beck refers to dramatisation as a method of emphasising individuality, not type. If the core of Bergson's comedy is a comic situation, Beck's drama seeks to introduce an exceptional person or hero, so the drama's structure becomes tragic. Beck's drama is not a classical tragedy because the drama of the environment is not restricted to the time and space of theatre play; it turns to everyday life through mass and digital media, inviting any individual to take part in it (Beck 1992). Since media tragedy has no temporal or spatial constraints, the selection of an exceptional person becomes the primary purpose, which defines the lines of drama and radicalisation. The exceptional person of Beck is not the utopian ideal, as s/he is in classical drama (Nietzsche 2013). By contrast, s/he should represent hazards and risks, and is more like an anti-hero. Nevertheless, the condition of the tragic hero's appearance remains the same in the case of a tragedy or a comedy: The drama is always a public action. Therefore, public perception is the chief force of radicalisation, whether it is comic or tragic. If comic radicalisation reveals normal conditions, then tragic radicalisation sets risk against the norm of social life. Beck states, 'the exceptional condition threatens to become the norm' (Beck 1992: 24).

The rise of risks closely follows the process of radicalisation and depends on the ties between the social realm and the individual. In the case of comedy, the fear of revealing a person's mechanistic character produces risks (Bergson 2003). The mechanisation of individuality is paid by laughter, and laughter is the uniting force for individuals, transforming them into the social type. Comic risk is considered to be *dramatically constructed* because it is formed within public action. On the contrary, the natural risks of Beck exist *per se* and are not the result of drama and radicalisation (Beck 1992). The drama is the path to *distribute* the power of risks and gives them a public form and attention. The selection of one object of dramatisation can lead to the maximisation or minimisation of the effect on adjacent or opposite objects (Ibid.: 31). When the only *constructed* risk of comedy is replaced by multiple, existing environmental risks, the key goal of drama becomes to individualise them and stress the differences and common features between the risks, not dramatic characters. If the sociality of comedy is manifested in the notion of a typical role (Bergson 2003), then the sociality of tragedy is thickening in the concept of the social type of risk. The change in the central social form from social role to risk makes sense of Beck's idea that within the tragic drama of the environment, risks become the norm of social life (Beck 1992). Beck's risky normativity of the social realm establishes the normative *horizon*, which is *socially constructed* by tragic drama and defines the area of a risky situation (Ibid.: 28). The natural risks of Beck and their forces are evaluated in terms of public perceptions, and are specific to certain social groups that account for risks as dangerous. The relativity of the risks and their normative horizon makes them multiply and clash with each other. Hence, the landscape, defined by the normative horizon of risk, becomes ambivalent; its borders and view will depend on the viewer's temporal location.

The shift from a comic role to risks in tragedy calls into question whether the public character of dramatic action is not focused on anti-heroes of environmental drama. If publicity is the way to radicalise the goods and bads of social life, then the unlimited radicalisation of a risky situation can lead to *catastrophe* (Ibid.). For Beck, a catastrophic condition is contradictory because it shows 'development (that) is not wanted' (Ibid.), but publicity of risks radicalises them, and this radicalisation increases side effects. Therefore, although a catastrophe is not wanted, the radicalisation of risks brings it closer, and environmental drama is an image of catastrophe.

Dramatic radicalisation is the only possible device to introduce the *invisible* risks of social life (Ibid.), which Beck underscores as well as comic drama, rendering the mechanical background of individual roles. The *visibility* of risks is not equal to their public character; rather, public introduction offers the possibility to accept natural risks and establish the horizon of a risky situation. Thus, *visibility* and *invisibility* are definitions of natural risks, and social risks are constructed during the development of the drama. Thus, we should also correct Beck's concept of catastrophe. While the catastrophic or emergency condition is the outcome of social drama (which relies on media publicity), the vision of risks does not make them automatically public. In contrast to Beck's *environment* (Ibid.), the vision of natural risks or the *landscape* includes visible and invisible risks and has *catastrophic potential*, but does not represent a future catastrophe itself (Beck 2006). Regarding the landscape's catastrophic potential, it is possible to refuse the idea of exceptional conditions as norms (Beck 1992: 24), which turns the drama of the environment into tragic. In contrast to the exceptional condition of drama, the horizon of vision is situational and creates the situational norms defined by visible and invisible risks.

The comic character of the *vision* and the *landscape* brings us back to the first question: 'How is the social character of the natural landscape described?' (though in a slightly different form). The sociality of drama is manifested in the social type or social role, while the sociality of vision is defined by the horizon of normativity, which does not represent anything but introduces the boundaries of action. If Bergson's comedy speaks about the comic order of social roles, Beck's tragedy refers to public catastrophes. Accordingly, the social image of risks is the arrangement of plural and contradictory relations where norms introduce the ordering and limit risks.

The vision of the landscape: Trauma and mess

Drama is the device of radicalisation, which divides the natural landscape along the lines of risk, and is defined by the comic laugh or tragedy of the hero. The natural landscape becomes social (not thanks to dramatic radicalisation); it takes shape in the vision of risks and their gradual changes. According to Beck, the vision of risks is not *a single* view of *one* risk; it is the perception of the multiplicity of risks from different angles (Beck 2006). Thus, the vision is a complex organization that coordinates the mess of possible views. Beck introduces two mechanisms of such coordination: *tele-vision*, which 'isolates *and* standardizes' (Beck 1992: 132) and produces individualisation, and the *cosmo(politan) vision*, which is defined by belonging to intimate social relations (Beck 2006). This is in contrast to physical distance and boundaries. Two definitions of *vision* by Beck are based on the distant relations that avoid publicity, while the public drama represents the close ties of social interchange.

The radicalisation of drama relies on exceptional situations. Contrary to the drama, the vision applies to normativity, which is based on standardisation in the case of *tele*-vision and the balancing of relations in the case of the *cosmo*-vision. Criticising and expanding on Beck's theory of risks, Jeffrey Alexander and Scott Lash suggest that risk normativity is social as well as cultural: Risk is *a cultural* norm (Alexander 1996; Lash 2000). The distinction between the two types of Beck's vision separates two definitions of culture. The first view on culture by Alexander is grounded in stabilization, and is opposite to Beck's idea of hidden risks (Alexander, Smith, 1996). The second perspective, by Scott Lash, follows Beck's theory and supposes that the visible order is not stable and depends on the instability of risks (Lash 1999, 2000). The key question is how risks are normalised and become public for Alexander, or visible for Lash.

Alexander and Smith claim that the distinction between visible/invisible risks is Beck's general drawback because it implies the concept of *hidden* risk (Alexander 1996, Alexander and Smith 1996). Here, Alexander makes a slight shift because Beck does not speak of *hiding* risks. He considers the risks' *invisibility* to be an inherent feature (Beck 1992). This shift allows Alexander and Smith to extend their criticism of Beck's theory and highlight its transcendental character, caused by the boundary between the mystery of hidden risks and public social order (Alexander and Smith, 1996). In opposition to Beck, Alexander introduced the idea of *trauma,* which is a public form of social risk, since, according to the late Durkheim, only public objects are social (Smelser, Alexander 1999; Alexander 2004). Following late Durkheim, Alexander calls such public social objects *symbols*, while non-public objects are profane-like *hidden* risks of Beck. To describe risks, Alexander refers to Durkheim's distinction between sacred and evil symbols (Durkheim 1995, B.III, Ch. 1, Ch. 5.IV). The sacred symbols are separated from the profane and are of two types: pure and impure (i.e., evil). If pure sacred objects are dangerous, they establish order, while impure objects lead to disorder, death, and sickness. Alexander suggests that trauma is a social representation of risks in the Durkheimian sense because the *hidden* risks cannot be social or sacred (Alexander 2006). Alexander looks for the possibility of avoiding the transcendental collapse of Beck's theory, so he claims that risks and trauma are part of the same domain, but puts them in different positions. While risks are 'mysterious discourse' that functions like myths, trauma cannot be its *other,* insists Alexander (Ibid.); the trauma is the situational way of evaluating past events as evil or dangerous.

Alexander returns to the problem of avoiding the border of representation by examining not risks ascribed to past (or future) events, but rather the value attributed to them. The transcendence that Alexander excludes in spatial terms returns through the back door: The trauma inserts the temporal division of a hidden, risky past and the public, traumatic present (Alexander 2006). This division between past and present defines the normative horizon of trauma, which Alexander deems to be rather moral (versus aesthetic) and which, using Beck's terms, enters the distance between past and present (Alexander 2008a). According to Alexander, the aim of representing traumatic events is to overcome the painful past and to introduce a new collective identity (Alexander 2004, 2006). In seek-

ing identity, vision transforms into drama: The horizon is closer and limited to the border of the arena of public representation. The only way to remain distant is to assume that an image or representation does not portray one's identity, but rather captures various identities. Hence, the vision is not a collective representation, but instead a gathering of representations arranged according to the normative horizon of trauma. The trauma works in the way that Beck called *tele-vision,* establishing the standard for individual identities (Beck 1992).

Lash points out that the main problem of Alexander's concept of trauma as a collective representation of risk is the tendency to dramatise the vision and retrospectively construct identity (Lash 2000). Lash criticises the notion of risk developed by Alexander with reference to Douglas and Wildawsky, because according to them, risk is perceived and does not exist *per se* (Ibid.). Lash argues that the recognition of risk as *public* does not make sense. Following Durkheim, Alexander tries to suggest the version of stabilised risk and cultural normativity that depends on the temporal horizon of trauma. Setting the temporal dimension of norms, Alexander ignores the instability of collective representations or symbols, and tries to displace the evil symbolism and role of disorder in social organisation (Alexander 2006). In contrast to Alexander, Lash moves from symbolic order to the instability of evil symbols, which are sources of risks and risky normativity (Lash 1993, 1999). The transition of grounds for the cultural norm from order to instability is possible because Lash moves from the late Durkheim's idea of culture as order to the duality of symbolic and allegoric drama, proposed by Walter Benjamin. While the Benjamin's symbolic drama is close to Alexander's public drama, and is focused on the stable representation of social relations, the allegorical one suggests the changeable, hidden, and situational meaning of the representations and relevant objects (Lash 1999, 2002; Benjamin 2019). With reference to Benjamin's allegory as unstable and invisible, Lash, Lury, and their colleagues express that culture is not a limited arena of action, but is rather a space-time continuity of the topological surface, where the hidden dramatic action can be guessed by its weakened projections and marks (Lash 2012; Lury, Parisi, Terranova 2012).

While, for Alexander, public drama defines the normativity of trauma, Lash regards allegorical dramatisation as *invisible* or even *absent* in public (Lash 1999). The representation of such a manifestation of absence is the *fragmented vision*, and is not either totally visible or completely hidden. Lash explains that the fragmented representation is similar to a newspaper story, which partly follows the story's entire narrative and is partly exploded by allegorical interventions of rumours and rehearsals (Lash 1998). Thus, the fragments of drama that are registered on the visible surface cannot serve for purposes of radicalisation, because there are numerous gaps in the story. The gaps in the representation of allegorical dramas are manifestations of *the absence* of order and is caused by hidden risks, so they set the horizon or limit for visible dramatic action. When the surface has marks of risks and fragments of drama, it organises and balances the relationships among these representations, so it can be called *the cosmopolitan vision* of Beck (Beck 2006). The distance in the case of Lash's allegorical surface appears in the absence of dramatic or close relations. Therefore, the vision is the outcome of tension between drama and risks, distance and closeness, the visible and the hidden.

In order to argue or develop Beck's idea of risk as a cultural norm, Alexander and Lash go in opposite ways, trying to overcome drama's representational character and introduce the landscape's social dimension. In both cases, the suggested approach does not achieve complete success: The traumatic vision of Alexander remains dramatic(Alexander 2006), while the topological vision of Lash is only possible as a balance between close and distance relations (Lash 1999). Despite the principal differences in two concepts of cultural normativity, they share the same general fragmented structure, which organises a multiplicity of identities in the case of Alexander and the fragmentation of drama of Lash. According to this fragmented structure, Beck's vision is a specific way of ordering diverse fragments along the horizon of normativity, which defines the method of rediscovering the landscape's social dimension.

Looking beyond the horizon: Perspective and spirals

The visions of the landscape by Alexander and Lash not only share the structural organisation of multiplicity fragments or identities. In addition, both approaches proceed from social actors and their roles, which are central for Bergson to material objects, whether artificial or natural. Turning from a social role to the object, Alexander and Lash take one more step from drama to vision. The tragic or comic dramatic action is arranged with the subjects participating in it, but in the case of Alexander and Lash, dramatic subjects are replaced by the social and material

representations of trauma or changing and invisible allegorical objects. Following this step, visions of the landscape shift from dramatic radicalisation to the gradual accumulation of changes (Beck 2006). Yet the visions of the landscape do not break away completely from the figurative representations, while the figure of the social subject is substituted for a material object.

In contrast to figurative representations, the distant and non-representational dimensions of landscape visions depend on the stabilisation of invisible risks and the visible horizon of normativity (Beck 2006). However, the notion of the horizon needs some clarification due to its link with the landscape and its role in the normalisation of the risk. The idea of the horizon differs based on perspective. According to Vitruvius and Serlio, linear perspective is a function of dramatic space with a single optical focus (Panofsky 1991). If the line of the horizon is not reduced to the level of optical focus, then it should arrange multiple perspective views. Thus, the horizon of non-representational vision is close not to the dramatic Renaissance perspective, but to manifested and divided images of the late Gothic (Panofsky 1968) and its revival in a fragmented *capriccio* of Mannerism views (Rosand 2002; Rowe 1950, Loktev 2004). The difference between the Renaissance and Mannerist horizons is expressed in the distinction of Leonardo da Vinci, who separates the mathematical line from lines drawn by hand. The first one is abstract and, as such, *pure* geometry, while the second 'shows the shapes of surfaces of dense bodies (that) are called contours'(Da Vinci 1956 *in* Rosand 2013: 207).

David Rosand, who cites Leonardo, describes the drawn line of a contour as the organising principle of the Mannerism painting, which is based on the changing dynamics of the serpentine shape or spiral (Rosand 1999, 2002: 278 – 98). If the horizon is not a Renaissance mathematical line of linear perspective, then it is non-stable and drawn. However, the idea of the serpentine or spiral horizon may seem confusing because the horizon is replaced by the 'spiral' skyline of the city or the contour of the mountains; it is totally hidden. The other form of the spiral stresses that instability and fragmentation are the main features of Leonardo's drawn line. Hence, the 'drawn' line of the horizon combines differently oriented perspective views, creating the illusion of the straight line, although it has different intensities at some points and can even be hidden or absent in some fragments (Rosand 2013). The drawn line, which is straight in form, is spirally changing according to the dynamic of line strength. When the horizon is not set by mathematical rules, but is rather drawn, it becomes unstable and risky. The drawn horizon leads to unstable, fragmented normativity for vision, and cannot guarantee the complete elimination of risks (Lash 1999, 2003). Therefore, the non-representational ('drawn') order of the landscape vision rests at the halfway point between radicality and normativity.

When Rosand refers to the idea of drawing, the drawing is not a plain graphical representation; it is the technique of recalling the memories of the artist and dense (or 'thick' in terms of Clifford Geertz) visual conceptualisations of social interactions (Rosand 1999). According to Rosand, the artist is a theoretician when he draws and *invents* its own graphical language, since drawing is the process, which includes imitation, classification, and recapitalisation of the visual experience (Rosand 1974, 1999). Considering drawing as a thick conceptualisation, visibility and dramatisation serve to accumulate changes and instability, although they remain the source of normativity for both Alexander and Lash. Shifting from the visible order of symbols to the invisibility of an allegorical gathering, Lash insists that the traditionally considered *bad* (which continuously changes) and disorder are not radical evil (Lash 1999, 2002). In contrast, invisible allegorical relations are an adequate answer to the on-going risky situation, because the changing risks can only be balanced in a non-strict, gradual way.

Whether the horizon is perspective or drawn, it is usually a visible line, which sets clear limits for visible space. When the horizon of normativity becomes invisible, or non-linear, or exploded, it stops guaranteeing order and does not define the vision. Beck's vision of normativity and culture, to which Alexander and Lash refer, turns to be situational and multiplied. The vision returns its force as the organisational concept for social interactions, but only if its definition goes beyond the visibility of the horizon (the way Rosand and Lash claim), and is open to more diverse interactions (Rosand 1999, Lash 2003). The turn to invisibility raises the complicated, risky question of the possibility of the social landscape: What is absent in the landscape vision? Lash's answer is an 'allegory' (Lash 2012) while Alexander refers to past events (Alexander 2006), but both try to explain invisible things through visible representations, although the goal should be to look behind them. Rosand explains that looking behind visible things is only possible by rebuilding the internal process, revealing the work of the imagination (Rosand 1999). The

transition from visibility to the invisibility of the imagination overturns the relationship between normativity and radicalisation. The drama radicalises visible relations to shed light on invisible risks, and the imagination radicalises the invisible or absent fragments of the horizon to establish visible norms.

Sequences of the Imagination

Image and organisation: Three types of landscape

When Bergson refers to the landscape as a social metaphor, he reduces the real landscape to its mere figure or scheme that he applies to social relations. Even if the natural landscape is social, it cannot be viewed in terms of figures or representations, because it is not stable or still. However, Lash and Lynch argue that the figure is part of the image whenever the background is visible (or not), or, strictly speaking, the image is the figure arranged according to the background order (Lynch 1985, Law, Lynch 1988). The figure can only be understood based on the background ordering from which it is separated by a metaphor. When the metaphor makes the figure distinct, the difference between the image and the background is clear. In the case of a photo of a landscape (Law, Lynch 1988) or an astronomical image of the sky (Lynch 1985), the image is continuous and does not have clear figures. Special devices, such as metaphors, are needed to introduce distinctions between the figure and the background. Still, only the landscape offers the chance to look behind the metaphors, while the background organises different figures and coordinates their metaphors.

Following Rosand, we can select two types of metaphors: social and visual, which can also be called organizational (Rosand 1974). The social metaphor is used by Bergson when he defines comedy as the *landscape*, reducing the landscape to several concepts, and finds similarities between these notions and the structure of comedy. This definition of social metaphor lies at the heart of social research. Rosand shows that a metaphor can also be visual and defined under the drawing and analytical material structure of the view (Ibid.). According to Rosand, a visual metaphor is assembled from 'remembered' or 'drawn' lines, which are not a simple imitation of nature, and pass the process of an artist's re-evaluation of field analysis (Rosand 1999). The remembered lines *construct* (i.e. organise) the drawing and its metaphors. Thus, visual metaphors work similarly to *organisational* metaphors. For Cooper and Law, the *organisation* is an alternative, non-reductionist way of representation of different modes of ordering (Cooper, Law 2015). Referring to the analysis of paintings, Law and Benschop maintain that the spatial organisation of paintings is a visual—and even rhetorical—reasoning of the view they represent (Law, Benschop 1998). Thus, if the natural (and material) landscape is a social object, then the landscape's socio-material background should be discussed according to two perspectives: social and visual-organisational.

In the second part, the paper discusses the social and organisational metaphors, with reference to Sergei Eisenstein's three types of landscape spatial composition (Eisenstein 1987). Eisenstein examines methods that make the composition of landscape paintings expressive or pathetic. In describing the visible or pathetic organisation of paintings by Piranesi, English sentimentalists, and Chinese landscapes, Eisenstein distinguishes between two types of organisation: dramatic and non-dramatic. The first type is based on the dramatic effect of spatial isolation and the opposition of elements (*Fig. 1, Type I*) (Ibid.: 149-150). The second type refers to the *absence* of dramatic effect and follows the temporal sequence, organized by the elements of the image that resemble each other with some variations (*Fig.1, Type II*). These two types of organisation are linked to the two types of Mannerism paintings highlighted by Rosand: the *capriccio*, which shows the interior urban landscape (Rosand 2002), and *hard pastoral* landscapes, which hint at the intimate view of the moral order (Rosand 1992). The first type of landscape, *capriccio*, comes close to Alexander's notion of a *monument* or icon, which characterises the collective symbol of trauma and replaces trauma with a new identity. The second, *natural* or *hard pastoral* landscape, is viewed as described by Lash and Urry, and is created by the gaze of the tourist, who seeks visual pleasure in it.

Aside from the dramatic and non-dramatic organisation of the image, Eisenstein mentions a special type of organisation of Chinese landscape paintings (*Fig.1, Type III*) (Eisenstein 1987: 233-234). Eisenstein does not mark it as a separate type, but it differs radically from the other two: It is composed of several independent sequences divided into views that cut the sequences and assemble new arrangements organised in stills. This last type is unlike the two others due to the indifference to the dramatic effect and balance of the spatial and temporal organisation. It comes close to the metaphor of social organisation by John Law because it tries to arrange sequences-narratives and works with complex representations. Law and Benchop apply their organisational concept to Paolo Uccelo's

painting *Battle of San Romano* (Law, Benschop 1998), so we will follow their analysis with Eisenstein's references to Uccelo's work in the film *Alexander Nevsky* (1938) (Faietti, Nardoni, Schmidt 2017). While the two (non)dramatic types refer to things that are hidden behind visible and metaphorical figures, the last one takes a step toward the non-representational idea of the landscape, and paves the path for the imaginary and comic vision.

Figure 1

Eisenstein's schematic analysis of the three types of pathetic composition by Sergei Eisenstein based on the analysis of classical Chinese landscapes



Note. Type I – a vertical landscape in Chinese art (Eisenstein 1987: 150, Fig. 12). Type II – a landscape with repeated motif variations (Ibid.: 233). Type III – a landscape that is a combination of sound and spatial aspects (Ibid.: 234).

Type I. Piranesi and Icon

The three types of compositional organisation, which Eisenstein discusses, illustrate his theory of *pathos*. Eisenstein defines pathos as the felling that makes you 'go outside yourself' (Eisenstein 1987: 27) in *ex-stasis* and changes the perception of things dramatically. *Ecstasy* is the effect of pathos in comic and tragic dramas (Eisenstein 1987; Podoroga 2017). Eisenstein's definition of pathos comes very close to Alexander's idea of aesthetic things as *icons* or, citing Freud, 'symbolic condensations', which depend on the immersion of the sensible experience and the subjectivity of mundane objects (Alexander 2008b). Not only are mundane objects icons; Alexander argues that public representations of trauma transform into monuments, which engage people in experiencing evil and painful past events (Alexander 2006). Yet Alexander speaks very little of how iconic immersion and influence can be achieved and expressed; his main interest is in seeing how people can interact with icons (Alexander 2008b). By contrast, Eisenstein's chief goal is to reveal the mechanisms of organisation in a pathetic situation. Following this goal, Eisenstein seeks an example of pathetic organisation and sheds light on the background's mundane devices; this makes pathetic organisation possible (Eisenstein 1987).

For Eisenstein, the pathetic drama opposes two radically different elements (Wolfflin calls it *contraposti*), which are juxtaposed in terms of their form, appearance, or position in space. The question is: How is such a pathetic drama presented in a landscape painting, and how does this affect the horizon, twisting it into a spiral? Eisenstein receives the answer in the works of Piranesi, especially in his series on *Dungeons* or *Imaginary Prisons* (*Fig.2*) (Eisenstein 1987). Eisenstein believes that *Imaginary Prisons* demonstrates the principle of the exploded perspective and horizon. Eisenstein studied different perspective directions and concluded that in Piranesi's drawings, all views are cut or intersected by other elements. Following Eisenstein, Manfredo Tafuri compares the composition of *Dungeons* with labyrinths, which breaks the perspective view and confuses the observer about the direction (Tafuri 1987). Although the horizon of view in the labyrinth is broken into pieces, they can be arranged to replace the patchwork of diverse volumes and spaces with coordinated composition.

The labyrinth of the horizon does not reveal the ecstasy of the drawing or mechanism that drives pathos. Still, the metaphor of the labyrinth describes the type of composition and its way of establishing the difference between

a figure and a background (*Fig. 3*). For Eisenstein, the labyrinth's structure is defined not only by broken views, but also by the complex structure of its elements. In the breaks of arches and bridges in *Dungeons* (Eisenstein 1987: 123-154), the front structure does not develop continuously; instead, in the depth of breaks, there are new structures, unnaturally reduced in comparison with the usual perspective. According to Eisenstein, Piranesi makes a mess of views that are placed within each other, but if the sequence of views is unwound and straightened, the composition of Piranesi looks like a 'vertical' Chinese landscape, where different views are adjacent and at the same scale. Eisenstein's interpretation loses one point: The Piranesi composition is organised in several layers that are placed at different distances and, thus, their elements have different scales. The organisational principle of the 'vertical' Chinese landscape is the level between views (Eisenstein 1987: 150). For Piranesi, the composition is gathered by the tension between layers, which differ in distance and scale. The movement between these layers creates the labyrinth's lines and turns the perspective view into the surface, which assembles broken pieces. The figures from the front layer (the major and closer elements) may serve as the background for the figures on the distant layer, which are reduced in size; vice versa, the distant figure can be considered as the background for the closer element. Hence, each element has a double background and figure at the same time.

Piranesi's scheme of pathetic composition provides a more detailed understanding of Alexander's iconography of objects (Alexander 2008a,b). For Alexander, the monuments that symbolise trauma are clear and close, while the icons refer to the condensation and compression of the meaning (Alexander 2008b). Hence, the monuments and icons correlate, respectively, with the close and distant figures of Piranesi's drawing. If any object of Piranesi is the figure and the background at the same time, then Alexander's objects combine features of monuments and icons. The duality of objects is the ground for immersion, as the object turns to the viewer in a contrasting way: If the viewer is the monumental or heroic person, this dissolves him in the background. If the viewer is typical, this reveals his/her heroic features (Alexander 2008a, Eisenstein 1987: 69-123). The image of Piranesi or the vision of Alexander is not pure tragic or comic, but tends to include the heroic objects as visible or as hidden. Since heroism is not *a feature of one* object, the vision underscores the heroic experience in different forms, so the hero explodes in many *visible* iconic or monumental pieces.

Figure 2

Giovanni Batista Piranesi (1763). Le Carceri d'Invenzione (Dungeon), plate XIV: The Gothic Arch. Princeton University Art Museum



Figure 3

Sergei Eisenstein. The four analytical drawings by Eisenstein of Piranesi's detail: The left is the 'ordinary' way of drawing, while the right is 'pathetic' and used by Piranesi (Eisenstein 1987: 148, Fig. 11)



Type II. Straight lines and curves

In Type I, the perspective of the view is interpreted in spatial terms. As such, it is broken by turning depth into the labyrinth's immersive surface. In Type II, Eisenstein turns to the temporal dimension. In contrast to the dramatic composition of Type I, he develops the idea of non-dramatic composition, which is defined by the sequence of events. Non-dramatic composition, according to Eisenstein, is a 'potential knot' of narrative (Eisenstein 1987: 270-271):

The arrangement of the cord allows one to transform it into a knot when the ends are pulled, but if the rope lies freely, the knot is only guessed at. Eisenstein introduces the metaphor of the potential knot to illustrate the effect of a non-sequential story that does not follow for the order of events, and shows how the dramatic knot is tied.

If we use the metaphor of the potential knot as a starting point in the description of a non-dramatic composition, the metaphor defines the non-dramatic organisation. (Eisenstein 1987: 270-271). First, the concept of non-dramatic composition suggests that there is the possibility of drama, but this drama is risky and is avoided. The potential knot and the danger of potential dramatisation set the main effect of the composition, which is waiting for—and resists—the risk. Second, the knot depends on two different systems defined by the ends of the rope. These systems are organised using different logic, and their conflict can lead to dramatisation and tying the rope. If the potential knot maintains an unstable balance of the two systems, the conflict would not start. Third, the organisation of the potential knot needs to be hidden, so the knot cannot be easily tied.

The concept of the potential knot is close to Lash and Urry's discussion on landscape perception in Chinese and English traditions. While Lash stresses the idea of the hidden contradiction of the natural forces in Chinese drawings (Lash 2012), Urry pays attention to rural walking tours when the walker follows socially approved ways formed by others (Urry 2012). Lash and Urry introduce two faces of landscape perception that are important for the potential knot of the landscape: The walker traces nature, and nature's forces are the source of potential conflict.

When Eisenstein refers to the idea of a non-dramatic composition, he likewise points to the organisation of musical sequences, which are based on the development of a main theme via variations and stylisations (Eisenstein 1987: 200-202). The line of a musical melody is similar to the trace of Urry's walker. For Eisenstein, the music it produces is close to that of a landscape drawing. The question is: How can one connect the walker and the landscape, and how does the tension of the walker and the view lead to the organisation of the potential knot? The answer is rooted in the works of John Ruskin, who establishes the link between the landscape and music, just like Eisenstein, and carefully works out a method of revealing the ties between the artist-walker and the view-painting (Ruskin 2009). According to Ruskin, the landscape should not be dramatised as pathetic music with principal tone, but is guided by a hidden dominant. Thus, a music passage works like the landscape of Urry, which gives the walker the space to have a free, unfocused view.

In describing the approach to the compositional organisation of a drawing, Ruskin refers to two different kinds of ordering (Ruskin 2009). One is a mathematically exact perspective with a strictly defined horizon and lines of view, while the other is the result of artistic perception, organising the storyline of the landscape drawing. The perspective view is defined by straight lines, according to which Ruskin builds the drawing of the architecture and natural objects, like clouds (*Fig. 4*) (Ruskin 2010, 2013). Yet Ruskin insists that the perspective is not the only way to see the landscape. Another technique is organised by repetitions and variations in the details of the painted forms. Following the gradual changes, one can see the arrangement of gradual curves that link the changes in a series, and which reveals the alternative to the perspective optical focus of the landscape (*Fig. 5*) (Ruskin 2009).

The alternative arrangement of gradual curves, or a 'tree', in terms of Ruskin, is hidden in the view and creates the potential knot of dramatisation from a straight perspective (Ruskin 2013). The only way to discover the 'tree' of the drawing is to study the similarities and variations in the background, which link essential details like the boats in Ruskin's example. Thus, the potential knot reveals itself in the shifts between background arrangements: from straight to curved. These details and the arrangement of trees result from the artistic interpretation of natural forms by the viewer or walker, and indicate their presence in the landscape view. As the potentiality of the knot creates the risk of radicalisation, the hidden arrangement of the viewer is also a source of radicalisation, because the artist turns reality into pieces, and recombines it according to his/her idea (*Fig. 6*) (Eisenstein 1949: 23). The conflict, which Lash sees in the landscape, is the result of walking in socially agreed upon ways, which create limits for the risky recombination, and weaken the drama to the mere potentiality of drama.

Figure 4

Ruskin. Modern Painters. Vol. 5 Plate LXV. The schemes of perspective create the composition of the clouds



Type III. The Mess of objects

Figure 5

(higher) Ruskin. Elements of Drawing. Plate 34 (higher). Ruskin's analysis after J. M. W. Turner Koblenz, Germany, 1842

Figbre 6

(lower) Eisenstein. The scheme of the drawing a cherry branch in the Japanese schools. The method of the storyboard (lower) (Eisenstein 1949: 23)



Eisenstein strictly opposes the composition of Type I and Type II as dramatic and non-dramatic (Eisenstein 1987: 233). Type I is supported by the object's duality, which is simultaneously a figure and a background. Type II is defined by the potential drama hidden in the duality of background arrangements, whether straight or curved. The visible or hidden dramatic character of both types does not allow them to overcome the tendency toward representation. In the dramatic composition, the object is visible and clear; in the non-dramatic one, it is hidden behind the frame of the view. In both cases, the drama of an object or hero should be expected. As we have discussed in the first part, the object's drama is tragic, and in the case of Eisenstein's dramatic composition, there is the realisation of a drama. One can see the outcome of dramatic transformations in Type I or the potential of drama in Type II. Thus, these two types of composition are not the drama itself, but refer to drama. Types I–II illustrate the two versions of *tragic vision,* which were developed by Alexander and Lash. If the tragic vision is possible, how can it shift to the *comic* one, and what role will there be for the distinction between the figure and the background in this shift?

Eisenstein does not clearly define Type III. As an extension of Type II, Type III includes more diverse variations and combinations of different themes and their arrangements. There is a linear development of several different themes, which are divided into motifs and organised in the sequence of separate stills. Eisenstein uses this approach in the film *Alexander Nevsky* (*Fig. 8*), where are motifs from *Paolo Uccello*'s work 'Battle of San Romano' (*Fig. 7*) (Faietti,

Nardoni, Schmidt 2017). Referring to Uccello's painting, Eisenstein does not use it literally; instead, he transcribes it into motifs and recombines them in a new order according to the concept of story (*Fig. 9*) (Eisenstein 1991). The transcription of the landscape of a battle shows the transformation of Uccello's picture in a different way, versus the analysis of Piranesi or Ruskin, because Eisenstein spots motifs and makes them into independent views. By selecting the motifs, which can differ from the single gesture regarding the view of the crowd, Eisenstein provides a distinction between the figure of the motif and the background, introducing the rules of transcription. The figure in the image is usually organised according to the composition of the background or its frame. When the figure is cut, there is no need in the context. The figure without a background resembles the icon-monuments of Alexander, which are simultaneously a figure and a background. Eisenstein describes the way in which he organises transcripts of the figure-views on the scroll through mapping, where the simplest map is the scroll that swings around one point, gathering all the motifs in one time and space (Eisenstein 1987: 243-252). Thus, the map is a reverse transcription, and the mess of figures lacks context. If we return to the motifs selected by Eisenstein from Uccello's work, there will be a map with overlapping, conflicting, and contradictory figures or framings (the same operation in *Fig. 5*). The map produced by the method of the reversed transcription map is not tragic, because the tragic hero should have the background of the choir. It is organised by the mess of figures, which lost their unique context and links, *and so are mechanistic and comic* in terms of Bergson (Kozintzev 2011; Podoroga 2017). The figures, returned to the original position, are not equal to the original; their cut reduces their meaning to the line of their border. Since the comic type of Bergson is dramatic, it makes plain the copying of the live movement, but the contradictions in the reconstructed version of the map do not allow the observer to see it as pure drama or as a non-dramatic landscape.

The contradictory mapping of Uccello overturns the classical art historian reading of this work and makes it look strange: It is no longer the linear perspective manifesto, as it is traditionally considered by art historians. Discussing Uccello's painting, John Law and Ruth Benschop place it against Vermeer's *View of Delft* with reference to Svetlana Alpers, who likens Vermeer's work to the maps of the 17th century (Law, Benschop 1998; Alpers 1983). Law and Benschop insist that the space of Vermeer is not simple; it is not a 'coherent cartographic view' because it follows the path of a moving person, and collects different views as in the case of Lash and Urry's walker. If the moving person/object is risky, it is not only an observer but also part of the view, introducing an alternative approach to arranging it. Hence, a risky moving object causes the incoherency of the views.

Law assumes that the incoherent, cartographic view is possible when the view is not a mere social construction of the world, but rather a *performance* driven by 'epistemic imagination' (Law 2004; Law, Benschop 1998), a term Law borrows from (Verran 1998). This statement becomes clear when we return to the comparison of Eisenstein's Uccello and Law's Vermeer. In both cases, there is a map, which is not literal; it includes views that contradict each other. These views are not fully presented in the picture, so we can only see fragments of it. If we try to use these fragments and interpret them in the way that Eisenstein does in his transcriptions, we manipulate and transform the fragments as objects. The incoherent map of Uccello's *Battle* or Vermeer's *View* is the mess of objects that the observer discovers, and reconstructs to imagine his/her own view. The reversed transcription or mapping is the contradictory vision, which reveals risks and makes them visible, but these risks are typical for a particular kind of transcription. Due to mapping, the map is *a comic* vision of Beck, while transcription sets the rules (or norms), limiting the imagination.

Figure 7

Niccolò Mauruzi da Tolentino at the Battle of San Romano (probably c. 1438–1440), National Gallery, London

Figure 8

Still from Alexander Nevsky (1938) Dir: Sergei Eisenstein DP: Eduard Tisse

Figure 9

Alexander Nevsky (1938) Dir: Sergei Eisenstein DP: Eduard Tisse. The sequence of the shots, music, composition, and intensity. (Eisenstein 1991)



Conclusion

Imagination and Allegory: The Art of Doubt

Eisenstein's pathetic theory helps us to understand the comic vision of Beck's risk and normativity, and to respond to the landscape comedy of Bergson. The landscape, according to Eisenstein and Law, is the dense view of the mess of contradictory, changeable sets of objects for which the observer cannot even strictly define their borders. These undefined borders of objects are similar to the undefined status of ruin in Georg Simmel's essay: The column should not be razed to its base, but it is only considered *ruined* if it is remarkably destroyed (Simmel 1958). Simmel's notice is more cautious and accurate than Bergson's. Where Bergson makes a strict distinction between the natural landscape and the social landscape of drama (Bergson 2003), Simmel sees the ruin as both natural and social object. If the ruin is the natural object, the collapse of the ruin can occur naturally and 'destroy the work of man' (Ibid.: 380). If the ruin is only social object, the slight crack of it distorts the 'unity of form' (Ibid.: 375). The ruin of Simmel balances these extremes, normalising them through the judgement of column's beauty. Eisenstein and Law also balance extremes in their theories, applied to the landscape, where mapping, as a form of judgement, organises the changes and sets the spiral, dynamic line for the horizon of normalisation.

Lash develops the concept of judgement as a kind of risk regulation, and refers to Benjamin's distinction between symbol and allegory (Lash 1998, 1999). While Lash focuses on risky situations, which are ordered by allegorical object or assemblage, Alexander shifts toward the duality of symbolism and stress on sacred symbols, which are grounded in the acceptance and immersion of evil symbols (Alexander 2008 a, b). The analysis of landscapes of architecture (*Type I*) and natural landscapes (*Type II*) implies that the source of the duality of Alexander's sacred/evil symbols and Lash's symbol/allegory is the cultural object, whether visible or invisible. In the case of Alexander's object, the monument-icon is visible and fragmented; in the case of the Lash and Urry's object-observer is invisible and influences the organisation of the landscape. However, until the landscape depends on objects, it remains tragic because the object acts like a hero, where comedy should transform the landscape's background (Nietzsche 2013). At once, Lash's allegorical object is closer to the background than the symbol, since it is supported not by dramatic composition, but by the organisation of vision. Following Verran's concept of the 'epistemic imaginary' (Verran 1998) and the link between imagination and allegory, suggested by Francois Jullien (Jullien 2004), Law introduces a different notion of allegory, which deals with the background (Law 2004). Jullien opposes the heroic allegory, represented by an object in the landscape, and the strategic allegory that defines and comes after the background (Jullien 2004). If the allegoric hero is close to the allegorical object of Benjamin, Jullien, and after him, Law describes the strategic allegory as the method of gatherings, which explore and test reality (Law 2004). The comic should not focus on objects, because they are tragic, but on the allegorical way of distinguishing objects, and gathering them in the background as a new set (*Type III*). By contrast, the symbolic method is the technique of the dramatic reading of the landscape, like Bergson's landscape metaphor of comedy (Bergson 2003).

If the comic vision is a method of translating the background into the object, then the background defines the horizon of normalisation and introduces rules that connect social and organisational-visual metaphors. Jullien (2004) and Verran (1998) in different ways insist that the background's epistemology is rooted in the imagination, and has nothing in common with the idea of theoretical truth or objectivity. The 'epistemic imaginary' of Verran is multiplied and contradictory (Verran 1998), while the strategic allegory of Jullien is based on the careful seeing and ability to recognise the tiniest deviations in background processes (Jullien 2004). Both approaches address the imagination as a way to treat the uncertainty of risks, appreciate and use them, where imagination is not a sensual or expressive feature (like Eisenstein's pathos). In contrast, for Verran and Jullien, the imagination is the ability to doubt and raise questions; it needs an unfocused view and must follow the background orderings. According to Jullien, the allegory-object is the strategic result of using an allegorical method, which can materialise and hold out temporal stability (Ibid.). The same is Simmel's ruin, which is the result of time passing, but should not stay completely destroyed.

For Law, the allegorical method is the technique of mapping, which allows coordinating contradictory situations and objects (Law 2004). When the landscape is defined at the beginning of the second part of the paper, the landscape is the result of interactions between social and organisational-visual metaphors. The allegorical method, grounded in the theories of Law and Jullien, reveals the way of translating social metaphors into organisational-visual and vice versa. The landscape, which is due to reverse transcription or mapping, consists of fragmented objects that are selected from the mess, and are organised according to norms of transcription. Thus, the transcription distinguishes figures or objects that are allegorical heroes, and transforms the organisational patterns of the image into the social patterns of the relationships between objects. In contrast, mapping gathers the exploded fragments of the landscape and returns them to the original position, translating the social relations between objects into spatial organisation. According to Law and Jullien, mapping is based on the allegorical method of the temporal arrangement of objects. It temporarily gets rid of the risks and suggests a coherent view (Law 2004; Jullien 2004). These temporal and organisational arrangements serve as material tests for the social metaphor, and provide a chance to explore it, but they do not *represent* it. The non-representational and comic vision of the landscape turns into a form of allegorical exploration of social situations, not as a metaphor, but as an analogy and testing model.

References

Alexander, J. C. (1996). Critical reflections on 'reflexive modernization'. Theory, culture & society, 13(4), 133-138.
Alexander, J. C. (2004). Toward a theory of cultural trauma. Cultural trauma and collective identity, 76(4), 620-639.
Alexander, J. C. (2006). The meanings of social life: A cultural sociology. Oxford University Press, USA.

Alexander, J. C. (2008a). Iconic experience in art and life: Surface/depth beginning with Giacometti's Standing Woman. Theory, Culture & Society, 25(5), 1-19.

Alexander, J. C. (2008b). Iconic consciousness: the material feeling of meaning. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26(5), 782-794.

Alexander, J. C., & Smith, P. (1996). Social science and salvation: risk society as mythical discourse. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 25(4), 251-262.

Alpers, S. (1983). The art of describing: Dutch art in the seventeenth century (Vol. 73). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity (Vol. 17). London: Sage.

Beck, U. (2006). Cosmopolitan vision. Cambridge: Polity.

Bergson, H. (2003). Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, The Project Gutenberg,
http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/laemc10.txt, accessed 06.09.2020.

Bergson, H. (2014). The philosophy of poetry: The genius of Lucretius. Philosophical Library/Open Road.

Benjamin, W. (2019). Origin of the German trauerspiel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Cooper, R., & Law, J. (2015). Organization: Distal and proximal views. In For Robert Cooper (pp. 207-243). Routledge.

Da Vinci, L. (1956). Treatise on Painting (Codex Urbinas Latinus 1270). Princeton University Press.

Durkheim, E. (1995). The elementary forms of the religious life. New York: Free Press.

Eisenstein, S. (1949). Film form. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Eisenstein, S. (1987). Nonindifferent Nature: Film and the Structure of Things. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Eisenstein, S. (1991). Vertical montage. SM Eisenstein: Selected Works, 2, 327-399.

Faietti, M., Nardoni, P., & Schmidt E. D. (2017). Ejzenštejn: la rivoluzione delle immagini. Catalogo della mostra. Firenze: Giunti / Firenze musei.

Jullien, F. (2004). A treatise on efficacy: Between Western and Chinese thinking. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Kozintsev, A. (2011). The mirror of laughter (Vol. 1). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Lash, S. (1993). Reflexive modernization: The aesthetic dimension. Theory, Culture & Society, 10(1), 1-23.

Lash, S. (1998). Being after time: towards a politics of melancholy. Journal for Cultural Research, 2(2-3), 305-319

Lash, S. (1999). Another modernity, a different rationality. Oxford: Blackwell.

Lash, S. (2000). Risk Culture. In B. Adam, U. Beck and J. van Loon (eds.). The Risk Society and Beyond Critical Issues for Social Theory. London: Sage.

Lash, S. (2002). Critique of information. London: Sage

Lash, S. (2003). Reflexivity as non-linearity. Theory, culture & society, 20(2), 49-57.

Lash, S. (2012). Deforming the figure: Topology and the social imaginary. Theory, Culture & Society, 29(4-5), 261-287.

Law, J. (2004). After method: Mess in social science research. Routledge.

Law, J., & Benschop, R. (1998). Resisting pictures: representation, distribution and ontological politics. The Sociological Review, 45(1), 158-182.

Law, J., & Lynch, M. (1988). Lists, field guides, and the descriptive organization of seeing: Birdwatching as an exemplary observational activity. Human Studies, 11(2), 271-303.

Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space (Vol. 142). Blackwell: Oxford.

Loktev, V. (2004). Barocco ot Michelangelo do Guarini (problema styla). [Baroque from Michelangelo to Guarini (problem of style)]. Moscow: Arhitektura. [in Russian]

Lury, C., Parisi, L., & Terranova, T. (2012). Introduction: The becoming topological of culture. Theory, Culture & Society, 29(4-5), 3-35.

Lynch, M. (1985). Discipline and the material form of images: An analysis of scientific visibility. Social studies of science, 15(1), 37-66.

Panofsky, E. (1991). Perspective as Symbolic Form. New York: Zone Book.

Podoroga, V. (2017). Vtoroj ekran. Sergei Eisenstein I kinematograf nasiliya. Zerkanaya podporka. Materialy k psychobiographii [The second screen: SM Eisenstein and the cinema of violence. Mirror support. The psychobiography

papers]. Vol. 1. Moscow: BREUS.
Rosand, D. (1974). Art history and criticism: The past as present. New Literary History, 5(3), 435-445.
Rosand D. (1992). Pastoral Topoi: On the Construction of Meaning in Landscape. In The Pastoral Landscape. Ed. by J. Dixon Hunt. Washington, 1992. P. 161177.
Rosand, D. (1999). Remembered Lines. In Memory & Oblivion (pp. 811-816). Springer, Dordrecht.
Rosand, D. (2002). Drawing acts: Studies in graphic expression and representation (p. 1055397). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosand, D. (2013). Time lines. The temporal dimension of marking. Moving Imagination: Explorations of gesture and inner movement, 89, 205.
Rowe, C. (1950). Mannerism and Modern Architecture. Architectural Review, 107, 289-99.
Ruskin, J. (2009). The Elements of Drawing. In Three Letters to Beginners. The Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/30325/30325-h/30325-h.htm, accessed 06.09.2020.
Ruskin, J. (2010). Modern Painters. Vol. IV. The Project Gutenberg, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/31623/31623-h/31623-h.htm, accessed 06.09.2020.
Ruskin, J. (2013). Modern Painters. Vol. V. The Project Gutenberg, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44329/44329-h/44329-h.htm, accessed 06.09.2020.
Simmel, G. (1958). Two essays. The Ruin. The Hudson Review, 11(3), 379-385.
Smelser, N. J., & Alexander, J. C. (1999). The Public Representation of Culture and History: Introduction. American Behavioral Scientist, 42(6), 913–921.
Tafuri, M. (1987). The Sphere and the Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Urry, J. (2012). Sociology beyond societies: Mobilities for the twenty-first century. London/New York: Routledge.
Verran, H. (1998). Re-imagining land ownership in Australia. Postcolonial Studies: Culture, Politics, Economy, 1(2), 237-254.

Conflict of Interest. The author declares no conflict of interest related to this study, authorship, or publication.

Авторлар туралы мәлімет / Сведения об авторах / Information about the author:

Nataliya Volkova – MA in Sociology, MA in Urban Planning, independent researcher, 3-5 Gazetny Lane, Building 1, Moscow, Russian Federation, 125009, chestrek@gmail.com, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6798-963X

Наталия Волкова – әлеуметтану ғылымдарының магистрі, қала құрылысын жоспарлау бағыты бойынша магистр, тәуелсіз зерттеуші, Газетный көшесі, 3-5, қ.1, Мәскеу, Ресей Федерациясы, 125009, chestrek@gmail.com, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6798-963X

Наталия Волкова – магистр социологии, магистр городского планирования, независимый исследователь, Газетный переулок, 3-5, с.1, Москва, Российская Федерация, 125009, chestrek@gmail.com, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6798-963X

Мақала туралы ақпарат / Информация о статье / Information about the article.

Редакцияға түсті / Поступила в редакцию / Entered the editorial office: 16.05.2026

Рецензенттер мақұлдаған / Одобрено рецензентами / Approved by reviewers:17.06.2026

Жариялауға қабылданды / Принята к публикации / Accepted for publication: 30.06,2026